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Wednesday, July 12, 2017

George Collins

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George Collins last won the day on August 29

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  1. True, but it does not make it the worst one by any stretch - even just among the RKKA planes. "Il[ushin]"s were not efficient but certainly effective enough tactically. The worst RKKA planes were less known and scarcely produced fighters Yak2/4 and very well known and mass produced Yak3, all pretty much tactically useless and vulnerable at the same time. On the other hand, minimally produced and therefore relatively unknown fighters I-185 and tactical bombers Tu-2 were among the best in their class.
  2. George Collins

    Vets & PTSD

  3. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    The battle of Stalingrad? What phase of it are you referring to? The Operation Uranus in 1943 was executed by a completely different Red Army (from top to bottom) than that holding the line on the west bank of Volga in 1942. Why don't you give us a pertinent example, void of conflations and misnomers? Like, an army of comparable size mobilized and maintained in concentrated pockets for more than several weeks on end in what formally was peace time? Granted, it would be hard to do, because not once in history - before or after - an army of this size with so much stuff in it ever existed. But I find the way you go about debating this particular subject very interesting in that you ignore the factual content - like the actual Plan that is now out in public domain for all to see - and rush to debate hypotheticals. That's not a stance of somebody interested in getting to the bottom of anything, but rather somebody who has a stake in defending a position at all cost.
  4. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    But why would they wait until 1944? If anything, Stalin’s geopolitical advantage peaked out in 1940.
  5. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    One other thing: I for one am aghast at another attempt to conflate concepts. The population - unarmed population that is - indeed was scared shitless ofy GULAG, where inmates were slaving away and thus producing value for the state. Over 5 million armed troops, assets, ammo and fuel in vast quantities is another matter altogether. It's pure waste that cannot be sustained for a long period of time without use, notwithstanding the risk to the regime (the latter actually becoming a reality in many instances later on, as RKKA unravelled).
  6. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    Ok, so Stalin would have kept and supplied over 5 million troops, tens of thousands tanks and war planes, countless artillery pieces and tons of ammunition and fuel tied up along the demarcation line indefinitely? Anybody remotely familiar with military logistics knows that it's sheer nonsense. And by the way, Stalin understood logistics very well, as it turned out.
  7. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    It's significant in that it rationally - without speculating about weird psychological disorders - explains the shock of RKKA brass (and Stalin, of course) on June 22 1941. It's even more significant in that it completely discredits Zhukov's memoirs, which is one of the cornerstones of the "consensus" in the academia on both sides of the pond about the second world war. You can criticize Suvorov all you want, but his indispensable contribution as a military historian is that he shines the light at the fraud that Zhukov's memoirs are.
  8. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    And? ...I'm not sure exactly who are you arguing with on this one. For all we know, the French did not intend to envade Germany, even having declared war on Hitler. Conversely, RKKA quite apparently did intend to strike Wehrmacht from the Lviv bulge toward Krakow and Katowice (as planned), but the striking force of RKKA's Southwest Front was cut off by Wehrmacht's Army Group South, while RKKA West Front north of Polesye swamps was overwhelmed by Army Group Center.
  9. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    Well, it's a little more complicated than that. But the count down for the war obviously begins in Moscow at the end of August 1939, where Ribbentrop and Molotov sign the Pact dividing Poland. Wehrmacht invades in a week, RKKA follows in over three weeks after the declaration of war against Hitler by UK and France. Poland is gobbled up; RKKA attacks Finland at the end of November. It does not go smoothly, but by March the Finns begin to wear down and in all probability Stalin stops short to avoid direct confrontation with western powers, while still being a de facto and de jure Hitler's ally - yet publicly complaining about the lack of fighting in "the phoney war". By mid-summer 1940, Wehrmacht defeats the French and the British on the continent, and Stalin invades Bessarabia and Bukovina (thus violating the Moscow Pact and advancing its tanks within a striking distance from Ploesti oil fields critical for Wehrmacht). Hitler abandons his plans to invade the British islands; RKKA General Staff begins drafting its "Considerations for Strategic Deployment Plan" against Wehrmacht (the first known version of this plan is dated September 1940). In November, Molotov flies to Berlin and annoys Hitler with territorial demands. Shortly after he leaves, Hitler issues Directive 21 (aka Plan Barbarossa) outlining the invasion of the USSR. For several days in December, RKKA General Staff conducts "war games" clearly aimed at Wehrmacht. Deployment race is on, with RKKA overwhelmingly superior in the number of assets, by the way. By all indications, Wehrmacht's invasion in June takes RKKA General Staff by surprise - not because of Stalin being delusional, as many in the western academia like to pontificate - but simply as a result of believing that Wehrmacht is behind in the deployment count. And why would they believe otherwise, when the "feared" panzer force contained less than 4 thousand tanks against over 10 thousand RKKA tanks in the theater? Now, whether or not the effect of the first strike was crucial, in just weeks, RKKA suffered from catastrophic loss of command and control.
  10. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    That's too easy, Philip. Give me something to doubt it.
  11. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    Here's the rub: based on the known facts, I don't see how there can be any question about "the interesting theory." It's the only theory that makes rational sense. But where Suvorov and Solonin differ is whether RKKA would succeed had it not been preempted by Wehrmacht. Suvorov says, "absolutely yes," referring to a very successful strike at the 6th Japanese Army at Khalkin Gol in August 1939 and Vasilevsky's invasion of Manchuria in August 1945. Solonin, who published meticulous research about the anatomy of RKKA collapse in 1941, says, "absolutely no," referring to a less than impressive RKKA actions in both wars with Finland (the Winter War of 1939 and its 1941 sequel), as well as the monstrous and disastrous for RKKA tank battle at Dubno at the end if June 1941, which apparently convinced Stalin to abandon the concept of mechanized corps.
  12. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    The point is that the uncovered versions of Considerations for Strategic Deployment was the ONLY known plan, and RKKA actual deployment remarkably mirrored the outline. As for readiness, it’s always relative and in doubt. What’s not in doubt is that RKKA amassed so many troops and assets - particularly around Lviv - that it would be impossible to keep them there for long just in case. Ironically, in June of 1941 RKKA had a unique superiority in assets, most of which would be lost in the insuing collapse.
  13. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    I have to disagree with you on this one. Granted that Suvorov was "caught" on quite a number of factual errors and exaggerations - mainly for rhetorical purposes, - his overarching theory born in late 70s remarkably held in light of the research conducted in the 90s, when some of the RKKA archive materials were made accessible for a limited time. The most sensational discovery was made by Mark Solonin, who retrieved about a dozen versions of the RKKA deployment plan (produced between the fall of 1940 and mid-May of 1941), all with a clear intention of striking Wehrmacht from the Lviv bulge toward Krakow and Katowice. No alternative plans have been ever produced by Suvorov's critics, even though they would have a much easier access to the archives in Russia, quite obviously.
  14. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    No I don't. Granted, it was not consistent from the "international law" stand point, but it was expedient from the geopolitical one. UK would rather have Hitler fight on multiple fronts than do so itself - especially since it was pretty evident that Roosevelt was on a pretty good footing with Stalin for whatever reason.
  15. George Collins

    Why the Axis lost the war.

    That's pretty ironic, because it was precisely the talks between the Germans and the Russians culminating in the Moscow Pact signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov (in Stalin's presence) that launched the second world war for all intents and purposes.
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